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Today's So Called Natural
Person Case Law |
This brings us to the
point where we need to look at the origin of these so called "natural
person cases" that have been repetitively used by the CRA in an attempt
to convince Canadians that the courts have already ruled that a natural person,
acting in their own capacity for their own benefit,
is directly included within the definition of the word "person" as
defined in subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act.
This is also the point where we
need to understand that law is very precise and courts only deal with
the issue being raised in the case at hand. Therefore, if an issue is
raised in court, the court will address it from the perspective from
which it was presented.
For example, if an unqualified
issue was raised, claiming you can ice skate on water, a court,
because of the unqualified nature of the issue at hand, could
easily rule against the claim.
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No You Can't |
Alternatively however, if
the same issue were raised and expressed in a more qualified manner,
then the same court could just as easily rule in support of the claim.
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Yes You Can |
How could this be, you ask? Well
with the use of an analogy, here's how this works. Considering
that water is H2O, and if it acts in one capacity, a liquid, then due
to the absence of any specific qualification in the issue being raised
as to the capacity of the water in question, it would not be
unjustifiable for the court to find that you can not ice skate on
water.
Whereas on the other hand, if you
were to raise the same issue but in a more specific and qualified
form, such as, claiming you can ice skate on water that's acting in
the capacity of ice, then all things being equal,
it would be totally justifiable
for the same court to find that you can ice skate on water.
It is this lack of
specificness and qualification in these so called natural person cases that has created
what appears to be a definitive
answer to our one simple question. However, you don't even need a law
degree to see for yourself that the one simple question that needs to
be asked was never even raised in any of these cases, other than in the
R. vs. Sydel case which we'll address on it's own after discussing the
commonality of the collection of cases that are being relied on in an
attempt to convince the populace that the C.R.A. has the legislative
authority to directly levy an income tax on the private property of a
natural person.
In regards to the majority of
these
so called natural person
cases,
the fact remains that each of these cases are the result of what could
be considered the originating natural person argument case, the
Kennedy v.
Canada [2000] O.J. No 3313. Virtually every case that followed this
case effectively raised the same question raised in the Kennedy case
and as a result of the unqualified nature of the question being raised
they each resulted in the same unqualified findings.
For example, here are a few of the
more prominent so called natural person cases that relied on the
originating Kennedy case as support for the findings. In each of
these cases, HMTQ v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675, R. v. Dick, 2003 BCPC
001, and R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 the “very specific
question” as Judge Stansfield (as
he was then) called it in paragraph 26 of R. v. Dick, which was
raised in each of these cases was in effect undistinguishable to the
question raised by Mr. Lindsay in Kennedy v. Canada [2000] O.J. No
3313. Which, as Judge Stansfield (as he was then) noted with
interest later on in paragraph 26 of R. v. Dick, Kennedy v. Canada
was also a case in which Mr. Lindsay appeared as agent.
In fact, Mr. Lindsay was not only
agent in the Kennedy and Dick cases, he was agent in Galbraith as
well, and acted on his own behalf in R. v. Lindsay. This commonality
of Mr. Lindsay’s presence accounts for the undistinguishable
character of the “very specific question”
that was raised in each of these cases.
The “very specific question”
that was raised in each of these
cases, which although expressed in different forms, was, in
chronological order, as follows;
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1.
Kennedy v. Canada [2000]
O.J. No 3313, at paragraph 6.
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“Is a natural person a person
included in the Income Tax Act who is subject to the income tax?”
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2.
HMTQ v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675,
at paragraph 35.
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“The final ground advanced by
Mr. Lindsay, in support of the application, is that Mr. Galbraith is
not a “tax payer” or “person” and accordingly, the Income Tax Act
does not apply to him.”
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3.
R. v. Dick, 2003
BCPC 00, as title to paragraph 17.
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“Is Mr. Dick a “person” and
“taxpayer” within the meaning of the Income Tax Act?”
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4.
R. v. Lindsay,
2006 BCCA 150, at paragraph 2.
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“At the outset, however, I
should note a unique, or at least unusual, feature of this case -
Mr. Lindsay's assertion that he is neither "a person" for income tax
purposes nor "the person" charged with the income tax offences.”
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Despite the different forms of
expression, it's reasonable to suggest that the “very
specific question” raised in each
of these cases can be encapsulated by the one question, “Is a
natural person a “person” included in the Income Tax Act?”
In fact, when you actually consider
this very specific, yet unqualified, question in the form it had
been asked, it's easy to agree with the numerous courts' findings,
at least to the same extent it is easy to agree with a court's
finding that you can ice skate on water, that a natural person is a
“person” included in the Income Tax Act, but only in an indirect way
to the extent a natural person acts in the capacity of "legal
representative" of a "taxpayer.”
Therefore,
when you consider what happens to a question when some qualifications
are added, it becomes clear that to the same extent
a court would be hard pressed
to find that you can
ice skate on water
if you were to raise the issue
in a more specific and qualified form, such as, you can't ice skate
on water when it is not in a frozen state, a court would be hard
pressed to find that a natural person, as defined in
the Canadian Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., by John A. Yogis,
Q.C.,
acting in their own capacity for their own benefit,
is directly
included within the definition of the word "person" as defined in
subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act.
Considering that the very specific,
yet unqualified, question raised in each of these cases can
reasonably be encapsulated by the one question, “Is a natural
person a “person” included in the Income Tax Act?”,
and the fact that
the Kennedy
v. Canada
was the originating case the
other courts were bound to agree
with, as Justice Wilson noted
that the argument presented by Galbraith is the same argument present by Mr.
Lindsay in Kennedy v. Canada, it is not only obvious but verifiable
that the one simple question, "Is a natural person, as
defined in
the Canadian Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., by John A. Yogis,
Q.C.,
acting in their own capacity for their own benefit,
is directly
included within the definition of the word "person" as defined in
subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act?",
is a very specific and qualified question unto itself that has
yet to be answered, as it distinctively raises the concept of
capacity, an element that has yet to be appropriately considered in this context
by any of the courts in Canada.
Nevertheless, heavy
reliance
on this original set of so called natural person case law has been
used with vigor by the CRA to bolster its hopes of winning every
subsequent case that dares to raise any issue involving income tax
and a natural person.
However, for
the CRA to continually succeed, especially in cases which challenge
these original so called natural person cases head on and expose
their irrelevancy when the main issue before the court involves the
concept of capacity, would undoubtedly require a questionable degree
of collusion from a court.
After all, if it can be shown that the
point in issue raised in the case at bar is distinguishably
different than a point in issue raised in a previous case being
relied upon for support by the opposition, then it would appear that
any reliance by the courts on the conclusions of a previous case, albeit similar, would be an affront to justice.
In fact, this fundamental principle of law that something similar is
not the same, is clearly expressed by the legal maxim;
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Talis non est
eadem, nam nullum simile est idem.
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What is like is not the same,
for nothing similar is the same.
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4 Co. 18.
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Behind the R.
vs. Turnnir Case, 2006 |
Over the past few
years there've been a few subsequent cases where Paradigm has been
mentioned and an issue
involving income tax and a natural person was raised. Considering
the original set of these so called natural person cases were
relied upon as support for the CRA's position, the question that
needs to be asked is... Was the point in issue raised in these
subsequent cases the SAME as the point issue raise in the set of
these original cases?
To address this
question we'll examine a couple of these cases in this section, and
look at a few more on the Official Propaganda page.
The first one we'll
look at is the R. vs. Turnnir, 2006 BCPC 460, case. Knowing little more
than what can be gleaned from the Reasons for Judgment, it appears
that although the issue of natural person and capacity were made
mention of in his defense, the issue of capacity was never advanced
as a point in issue.
Therefore, and regardless of the fact that 3 of the 4 cases from the
original set of the so called natural person cases were relied upon by the CRA to secure a
conviction in this case, answering the question, was
the point in issue raised in this case the SAME as the point issue
raised in this original set
of
cases,
becomes irrelevant.
Nevertheless, other
lessons can be learned when we read a few of the comments made by
the judge in paragraph 65 of his Reasons for Judgment.
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R. vs.
Turnnir, 2006 BCPC 460 |
Judge J. O‘C. Wingham
Paragraph.
65:
I have carefully reviewed the
evidence of the accused. I have several difficulties with
that evidence. It contains numerous inconsistencies and, at
times it defied logic. My concerns about his evidence include
the following:
Point 1.
The accused testified that materials contained in Exhibit 2,
Tabs 3 and 4 are materials he received from Russell Porisky
in early 2000. The materials in question bear a statement
that they are copyrighted 2001.
Point 2.
The accused testified that a video tape played at the trial
was of a seminar he attended in 2000.... The copyright on
the video is 2002.
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I
trust you noticed the
inconsistencies
in his testimony. If not re-read it, and pay particular attention to
the dates.
It's testimony like this that destroys an individual's credibility.
Now with all due respect to Mr. Turnnir, for at least he had the
courage to attempt to stand up for his rights despite his apparent
lack of knowledge, this case is a great example of what can happen
when someone believes they understand the intricacies of the Tax
Game just because they've learnt they're a natural person.
Perhaps if he continued his study of the information he gleaned from
attending a seminar and
watching a video a few times, then instead of concluding the
words natural person were some kind of magic words that when uttered
sent the CRA running, he might have better understood that the
relationship a natural person has with a "taxpayer" is an indirect
relationship, only to the extent a natural person acts in the
capacity of "legal representative" of the "taxpayer" and to this
extent the natural person is not even recognized in law as a natural
person but merely a "legal representative", an artificial person,
and in turn he would have come to understand that when a fiduciary
obligation is created during a time period, and to the extent he was
acting in the capacity of "legal representative" of a "taxpayer",
which it looks like he was during the time period in question, any
attempt to apply his new found knowledge, albeit insufficient, would
have been futile and wouldn't have voided the pre-imposed obligation
he incurred to the extent he acted in the capacity of "legal representative" of the 'taxpayer" during
that time period.
In short, had he not attempted to back date his knowledge, and
instead spent time to learn enough to restructure his affairs
properly to fall outside the scope of the taxing act, as is his
common law right to do so, not only would he have been able to
present a defense that would have preserved his credibility, odds
are he may not have even been picked by the CRA to be their 2006
Propaganda Poster Child of the Year.
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Canada Revenue Agency
We're Here to Serve You...
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...To The International Banking
Cartel |
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Inside
The R. vs. Sydel Case, 2005 |
This brings us to
the R. vs. Sydel, 2005 BCPC 413, case. Unless you attended all the
court proceedings or have had an opportunity to read our 54 page book entitled,
Paradigm’s
Analysis of the Honourable Judge Meyers’ Reasons for Judgment
In the
R. v. Sydel Case,
you may not have heard of this case. However, if you have heard of
it, then it's highly likely that whatever you know about it is just
what they wanted you to know.
If the latter is the
case, then you're most likely not even aware of the 150 page
written argument that was submitted in an attempt to raise the
issue of capacity, which by the way was never addressed by the court, under the
pretext that this issue was the "same"
as the original set of so called
natural person cases we just looked at, and you most definitely
would never have known that the one simple question was
raised in this case. The reason for this void of information in the
mainstream is that everything that has been allowed to reach
the public record is conveniently absent of any clear reference to
these important details.
Nevertheless, and regardless of the fact that the question raised in
the Sydel case was distinguishably different from the question raised
in the
original set
of so called natural person cases, as none of them dealt with the
issue of capacity, the Sydel case provides a couple of
examples of the extent the system will go to
in an attempt
to
convince the populace that the C.R.A. has the legislative authority to
directly levy an income tax on the private property of a natural
person
instead of publicly answering
a similar, yet qualified
question that incorporates the issue of capacity.
For the first example, if the question being raised is,
“Is a natural person a “person” included
in the Income Tax Act?”
Then, in all honesty, given the
unqualified nature of this question, it's easy to see how the answer
to it could be “Yes”, as the specific issue of capacity was never
raised.
Therefore,
that being the case, which it effectively was in the original set of
so called natural person cases the
system seems so eager to rely on, then although the answer appears to
suggest that the Income Tax Act can operate notwithstanding the
Canadian Bill of Rights without having the required expressed
declaration, in prescribed form, to do so, these other judges never
actually made such a qualified assertion in clear and unequivocal
language, but merely provided an unqualified answer to an unqualified
question.
Whereas on the other hand, if the more qualified
question being raised is,
"Is a natural person, as
defined in
the Canadian Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., by John A. Yogis,
Q.C.,
acting in their own capacity for their own benefit,
directly
included within the definition of the word "person" as defined in
subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act?",
then given the qualified nature of this question,
unless a judge is able to further explain how the Income Tax Act can
operate notwithstanding
the Canadian
Bill of Rights without having the required expressed declaration, in
prescribed form, to do so, it would appear that the answer would have
to be, “No”.
Therefore, it would appear that
unless a judge is ready willing and able to further explain how the
Income Tax Act can operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of
Rights, any reliance on a case, or even a collection of cases that
do not properly address the issue of capacity is only further
evidence of the fact that things are not what they seem, as there is
no disagreement that the Income Tax Act can apply to a natural
person, but only indirectly,
to the extent a natural person
acts in the capacity of “legal representative” of the “taxpayer”.
In
this
second example of the extent the system will go to
to convince the populace that the C.R.A. has the legislative
authority to directly levy an income tax on the private property of
a natural person, we
can see in the
following quote how the judge selectively placed quotation marks
around his first use of the word person and yet not his second use
of the same word.
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R. vs. Sydel,
2005 BCPC 413 |
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Paragraph 18, Reasons for Judgment
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"...that
human beings are “persons” and persons who earn income, have
to pay income taxes."
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Now considering it should be safe to assume that
judges are reasonably intelligent and can precisely express their
thoughts in sentence form, his obvious creative writing technique
makes it easy to speculate that
the judge intentionally put in the effort to indicate that his use
of the word for each person carried a different meaning in order to create an
ambiguous and unqualified statement in an attempt to preserve the
illusion that
the C.R.A. has the legislative
authority to directly levy an income tax on the private property of
a natural person.
In addition,
this speculative theory appears to have even more merit
when you consider the fact that anyone who is willing to spend the
time to
perform the task of interpretation in order to provide a wholistic
analysis of the Income Tax Act's definition of the word "person" and
its implications in regards to the object and scheme of the Act
would clearly see that although the judge's statement is ambiguous
and unqualified, it is, in essence, correct.
After all, isn’t a human being with the capacity for
rights or duties recognized in this legal system as a “natural
person”? And can’t a “natural person”, having the unlimited ability
to act in different capacities, act in a capacity that allows them
to be recognized in law as a “person”?
And if the capacity they chose to
act in was that of “legal representative” of a “taxpayer”, and a
“legal representative” is one such “person” contained within the
Income Tax Act’s definition of the word “person”, then couldn’t it
be said, although ambiguously and unqualified, that a human being is
a “person”?
With the answers to these questions
being verifiably, “Yes”, then to the extent a “natural person” acts
in the capacity of “legal representative” of a “taxpayer”, if they
receive an amount for the benefit of a “taxpayer” from an “office”,
“employment”, “business” or “property”, isn’t that the “taxpayer’s”
income for the taxation year for
which the “legal representative” is jointly and severally liable with the
“taxpayer” to pay each amount payable under the Income Tax Act by
the “taxpayer” at or before that time and that remains unpaid, to
the extent that the “legal representative” is at that time in
possession or control, in
the capacity of “legal representative”, of property that belongs or
belonged to, or that is or was held for the benefit of, the
“taxpayer” or the “taxpayer’s” estate?
Of course it is, at least that’s
what a reasonable interpretation of the Income Tax Act will confirm. So
until a member of the judiciary is ready, willing, and able to rephrase such a statement
in a more unambiguous and qualified manner,
to suggest that a judge's ambiguous
and unqualified statement “that
human beings are “persons” and persons who earn income, have to pay
income taxes.", is the same as
saying that a natural person is directly included within the Income
Tax Act's definition of the word "person" is not only premature,
but patently unreasonable as well, especially when honest consideration is given to the
principles of fundamental law this country was founded upon.
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A
Real Natural Person Case Law |
In closing, let's take a look
at what could be called a real natural person case law. But first, it would appear
that
after considering even a few of the inherent conflicts that would be
created by taking the position that a natural person is directly
included
within the Income Tax Act's definition of the word "person" and the
fact that after more than five years of asking one simple question
the C.R.A.,
the judiciary and apparently every politician and professional
association in this country has done
everything in their power to avoid answering
the question in clear and unequivocal language, their
repetitive pattern of
intentional evasive behavior is not only their way of tacitly confirming that the
actual answer to the one simple question
is a definitive…
"No, ... A natural person, as defined in
the Canadian Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., by John A. Yogis,
Q.C.,
acting in their own capacity for their own benefit,
is not directly
included within the definition of the word "person" as defined in
subsection 248(1) of the Income Tax Act"...
...it's
also their way of tacitly confirming
that the fundamental principle of law,
as more eloquently expressed in the following excerpt from Levene v.
Inland Revenue Commissioners, H.L.(E.) [1928] A.C., is still
recognized in Canada, and that all natural persons are free to
structure their affairs so they fall outside the scope of the taxing
acts, and by doing so they are not subject to legal penalties and
prosecution at the discriminatory discretion of the C.R.A. and its
agents if they do not surrender their private property to the C.R.A.,
without due process of law.
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Levene v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners, H.L.(E.) [1928] A.C. |
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"It
is trite law that His Majesty’s subjects are free, if they
can, to make their own arrangements, so that their cases may
fall outside the scope of the taxing acts.
They incur no legal
penalties and, strictly speaking, no moral censure if, having
considered the lines drawn by the legislature for the
imposition of taxes, they make it their business to walk
outside them.”
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